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Note
The Fate of Pending Motions on Appeal from
Judgment: The Consequences of Minnesota's
Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 104.01
J. Jeff Oxley
Minnesota's rule controlling the timing of an appeal of a
civil judgment differs substantially from the rules governing
federal appeal proceedings and state criminal proceedings.1
Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (which served
1. The rule governing the timing of appeals in Minnesota civil cases is
Minnesota Rule of Appellate Procedure 104.01. The comparable federal rule is
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The rule controlling the
timing of criminal appeals in Minnesota is Rule 26 of the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
As stated by the Rules Enabling Act, the purpose of the federal rules is to
regulate practice and procedure and not to "abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). The Supreme Court adopted the
Federal Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure in 1968. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT
ET AL., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 104, at 520 (3d ed. 1976).
Prior to that year, Civil Rules 73-76 and Criminal Rules 37-39 prescribed civil
and criminal appellate procedures. I& Wright considers the simplified proce-
dures for taking an appeal under the federal rules to be "one of the most strik-
ing achievements" of the federal rules. Id-
Under the federal rules, certain post-trial motions delay the starting of
the time for taking an appeal from judgment. Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Appeals in Civil Cases
(1) In a civil case in which an appeal is permitted by law as of
right from a district court to a court of appeals the notice of appeal
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order ap-
pealed ....
i4)" If a timely motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is filed in the district court by any party. (i) for judgment under Rule
50(b); (ii) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of
fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required
if the motion is granted; (iii) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
judgment; or (iv) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal
for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new
trial or granting or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal
filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed
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as a model for Minnesota's Rules of Civil Appellate Proce-
dure2) and Minnesota's Rules of Criminal Procedure, a timely
time measured from the entry of the order disposing of the motion as
provided above.
FED. R. App. P. 4.
The Advisory Committee for Minnesota's Rules of Criminal Procedure
based the provisions for the commencement of the time period for taking an
appeal in criminal proceedings on Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28 cmt. Minnesota's criminal procedures allow
criminal defendants to move for a new trial and permit courts to vacate judg-
ments. Id. A motion to vacate the judgment must be made within 15 days fol-
lowing a verdict or finding of guilty, or within such time as the court may set
during the 15-day period. MINN. R. Canm. P. 26.04(2). Rule 26.04(1)(3) requires
a party to serve notice of a motion for a new trial within 15 days following a
verdict or finding of guilty. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.04(1)(3). The court must
hear the motion within 30 days unless it decides to extend the period for good
cause shown. Id
Many states have a rule governing appeals in civil cases similar to Rule
4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See ALA. R. App. P.
4(a)(3); Aiz. R. CIrv. App. P. 9(b); AL. R. App. P. 4(b)-(c); CoNN. R. SUP. CT.
§ 4009; HAW. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 303(a)(2); KY. R. CIv. P.
73.02(e); ME. R. CIv. P. 73(a); MD. R. App. REv. 8-202(c); MICH. APP. R.
7.204(A); MiSS. R. SUP. CT. 4(d); Mo. R. Crv. P. 81.05; MoNT. R. App. P. 5(a)(4);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1912(2) (Supp. 1991); NEv. R. APP. P. 4(a); N.C. R. APP.
P. 3(c); N.D. R. APP. P. 4(a); OHio R. App. P. 4(A); WASH. L App. P. 5.2(e).
2. The goal of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Appellate
Procedure in the mid-1960s was to make Minnesota's civil appellate procedure
as much like the newly proposed rules of federal appellate procedure as possi-
ble. MuN. R. CIV. APP. P. preliminary cmt. The Minnesota Legislature en-
acted the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure in 1967. Id.
In 1982, the voters approved a constitutional amendment to create an in-
termediate appellate court, Court of Appeals Act, ch. 501, 1982 Minn. Laws
569, and the Minnesota Supreme Court directed the Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure to revise the rules. See David W. Lar-
son, Jurisdiction of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
627, 631-32 (1984).
The Committee explained the variances between federal and state rules as
follows:
Departures from the proposed federal rules consist in the main of
preserving practices which are established by statute or which are
deemed worthy of retention, and of certain deletions and additions re-
quired by the differences in the structure of the judicial systems of
the two governments.
MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. preliminary cmt. Notably, however, the Committee did
not conform to the federal rules when setting the time period within which a
party must appeal. The Committee set different standards because it did not
rely on Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the parallel
federal provision for civil proceedings, when drafting this portion of the Min-
nesota rules.
The predecessor to Rule 104.01 read as follows: "An appeal from a judg-
ment may be taken within 90 days after the entry thereof, and from an order
within 30 days after service of written notice of the filing thereof by the ad-
verse party." MINN. STAT. § 605.08(1) (1965) (repealed 1974).
With the adoption of Minnesota's Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure in
[Vol. 76:10411042
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post-trial motion postpones the commencement of the period
for taking an appeal until the trial court enters an order.3 Both
federal appellate and state criminal rules also allow district
courts to grant extensions for filing an appeal.4
1967, Rule 104 superseded the former § 605.08(1). The state legislature for-
mally repealed the statute in 1974. Act of April 9, 1974, ch. 395, § 11, 1974
Minn. Laws 707. Rule 104.01, however, carried forward the earlier statute es-
sentially unchanged.
3. In federal appellate practice, motions to make additional findings of
fact, to alter or amend the judgment, or for a new trial are timely only if made
within ten days of entry of judgment, and only a timely motion postpones the
running of the time for appeal until entry of the order disposing of the motion.
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4) (incorporating 10-day limit of FED. R. CIrv. P. 50(b),
52(b), 59); see 9 JAMES W. MOORE ET AT, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACCE 1
204.12[2], at 4-83 (2d ed. 1991); 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2812, at 81 (1973). Rule 6(b) proscribes
enlargements of the time period for filing pest-trial motions. FED. R. CIV. P.
6(b).
Note that not all post-trial motions extend the time period for filing an
appeal. In Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U.S. 265 (1988) (per curiam), the
Supreme Court held that an application for costs, which respondents described
as a motion to amend the judgment, did not extend the time period for appeal.
Id. at 269; see Charles W. Adams, The Timing ofAppeals Under Rule 4(a)(4) of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 123 F.R.D. 371, 371 n.2, 384-93 (1988).
This issue was important in Buchanan, where the respondents filed their
application for costs two days after the petitioners had filed a notice of appeal,
485 U.S. at 266, because Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure requires dismissal of prematurely filed appeals. See supra note 1.
Although the petitioners were allowed to proceed with their appeal, some
commentators regard the federal rule as overly harsh. See Adams, supra, at
375-76.
The Minnesota criminal rules also set strict time limits for filing a notice
of appeal. Indeed, the court of appeals may, in the interests of justice, suspend
the provisions or requirements of any rules affecting criminal appeals except
the rule setting the time for filing notice of an appeal. MINN. R. CRIM. P.
28.01(3). Defendants must appeal within 90 days after final judgment or entry
of order in felony and gross misdemeanor cases and within 10 days in misde-
meanor cases. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02(4)(3). Parties may appeal from an or-
der denying post-conviction relief within 60 days of entry of the order. Id. In
first degree murder cases, Rule 29 governs the defendant's right to appeal.
Rule 29.03(3) gives the defendant who is convicted of first degree murder 90
days from final judgment to appeal. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.03(3). An order de-
nying a post-trial motion for a new trial or vacating the judgment in criminal
proceedings is reviewable on appeal from the judgment. MINN. R. CRIM. P.
28.02(4)(3).
4. In criminal proceedings, the trial court can extend the time for appeal.
MmN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02(4)(3). As in civil proceedings, an appeal does not stay
the execution of judgment or sentence unless the trial court judge or the ap-
pellate judge so orders. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.02(6).
A federal district court may extend the time period for taking an appeal
on a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. FED. R. AP. P. 4(a)(5). A
post-trial motion in federal courts does not automatically stay entry of judg-
ment, although Rule 62(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives the
1992] 1043
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In contrast, post-trial motions do not toll the time period
within which an appeal from a judgment is permissible under
Minnesota's Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. Minnesota
Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 104.01 requires parties to ap-
peal from a judgment within ninety days of its entry by the
clerk of the district court.5 District courts also lack the power
to grant extensions for filing appeals.
No rule in Minnesota civil trial or appellate procedure,
however, orders a district court to decide a post-trial motion
within any fixed time limit. Once a party perfects an appeal,
the district court surrenders jurisdiction on the issues appealed
to the appellate court6 regardless of whether any post-trial mo-
tions are pending.7 The state's rules do not detail what the
trial court discretion to stay execution or enforcement of the judgment until it
decides the motion. See 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 2903, at 312.
5. Rule 104.01 reads in pertinent part:
An appeal may be taken from a judgment within 90 days after its en-
try, and from an order within 30 days after service by the adverse
party of written notice of filing unless a different time is provided by
law.
MINN. R Civ. App. P. 104.01.
6. Minnesota courts have held that procedural requirements related to
the timing of appeals are jurisdictional. See Schaust v. Town Bd., 204 N.W.2d
646, 648 (Minn. 1973) (noting that "the limitation of time within which an ap-
peal may be taken from an appealable order is jurisdictional" (citing Arndt v.
Minnesota Educ. Ass'n, 134 N.W.2d 136, 137-38 (Minn. 1965))); Nichols v Mei-
lahn, 444 N.W.2d 872, 875 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
During the pendency of an appeal, the trial court even loses its authority
to correct clerical errors in the judgment without applying for permission
from the court of appeals. MINN. R. CIV. P. 60.01. This rule permits the trial
court to correct clerical mistakes in judgments on its own initiative or on mo-
tion, but during the pendency of an appeal, it may do so only with the permis-
sion of the appellate court. See, e.g., Kath v. Kath, 55 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Minn.
1952) (perfection of an appeal suspends the trial court's power to remedy inad-
vertent errors); Cronin v. Cronin, 372 N.W.2d 778, 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(trial court did not apply for leave to amend the judgment to correct a typo-
graphical error and, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to order the judgment
corrected).
When a party files an appeal and wishes to stay execution of the judgment
pending the appeal, the party must post bond. MINN. R. CIv. APP. P. 108. The
trial court may continue an injunction even while an appeal is pending despite
the filing of cost and supersedeas bonds. David N. Volkmann Constr., Inc. v.
Isaacs, 428 N.W.2d 875, 876 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing State v. Robnan, Inc.,
107 N.W.2d 51, 53 (Minn. 1960)).
7. Because the rules offer no instruction, this suggests that the possibil-
ity of missing or late rulings did not occur to the Rules Advisory Committee.
In the normal course of proceedings after a trial court had arrived at judg-
ment, the parties would make all their post-trial motions, district courts would
rule on the motions before 90 days from judgment had passed, and then a
party would decide whether to appeal from judgment. Even if the trial court
1044 Vol. 76:1041
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court of appeals or district courts should do when a party
makes an "early" appeal,8 that is, when the party appeals so
soon after entry of judgment that the trial court does not have
a full opportunity to rule on post-trial motions before it loses
jurisdiction. Nor do the rules explain what the courts should
do when the running of the ninety-day time period forces a
party to appeal before the trial court rules on post-trial mo-
tions. In this situation, the court of appeals confronts either a
"missing" ruling, in which the district court has not ruled on
the motion, or a "late" ruling, in which the trial court ruled af-
ter the filing of the appeal.9 The rules do not state whether dis-
did not decide the post-trial motions within 90 days, the time period for appeal
from judgment could be irrelevant because a party could separately appeal an
order denying a motion for a new trial and thereby obtain review of "any or-
der affecting the order from which the appeal is taken." MINN. R. CIv. APP. P.
103.04. The court of appeals has broad powers: an appellate judge "may re-
verse, affirm or modify the... order appealed from or take any other action as
the interest of justice may require." I&
Interestingly, a problem similar to that caused by Rule 104.01 existed in
the pre-1979 federal rules. The United States Supreme Court noticed an
anomaly in the pre-1979 federal rules:
Under pre-1979 procedures, a district court lacked jurisdiction to en-
tertain a motion to vacate, alter, or amend a judgment after a notice
of appeal was filed. However, if the timing was reversed-if the no-
tice of appeal was filed after the motion to vacate, alter, or amend the
judgment-two seemingly inconsistent conclusions were generally
held to follow: the district court retained jurisdiction to decide the
motion, but the notice of appeal was nonetheless considered adequate
for purposes of beginning the appeals process. The reason this theo-
retical inconsistency was tolerable in practice was that the district
courts did not automatically inform the courts of appeals when a no-
tice of appeal had been filed, and there was therefore little danger a
district court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously analyz-
ing the same judgment.
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 59 (1982) (citations
omitted).
8. An "early" appeal occurs when a party appeals from judgment while
post-trial motions are pending and does so well before the time limit expires.
In this case, the appellant does not give the trial court a full opportunity to
rule on the motions. Early appeals are infrequent. Only rarely does a party
perceive a benefit in raising an issue in a post-trial motion to the district court
and subsequently abandon that motion to appeal from judgment. See Ama-
tuzio v. Amatuzio, 431 N.W.2d 588, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (appellant filed
post-trial motion 12 days after judgment and appeal 19 days after judgment).
9. "Missing" or "late" rulings are more common than early appeals. Rul-
ings are "missing" when the timing rule forces an appeal and the trial court
has not decided pending post-trial motions by the time the appellate court con-
siders the appeal. Since the creation of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in
1983, at least 16 cases involved missing or late rulings. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Ap-
ple Valley Health Care Ctr., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990);
Town of Belle Prairie v. Kliber, 448 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989);
Rudnitski v. Seely, 441 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in par4
10451992]
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trict courts should decide post-trial motions even if the ruling is
late or if they should suspend consideration of such motions im-
mediately once a party appeals. Similarly, the rules give the
court of appeals no instructions for whether to return an unfin-
ished case to the trial court or whether to consider a trial court
ruling made after the appeal divested the trial court of
jurisdiction.
The civil appeals timing rules pose procedural dilemmas
which are not merely theoretical possibilities. Since the crea-
tion of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in 1983, cases involving
these issues have appeared frequently,10 and increases in the
complexity and volume of civil litigation in Minnesota suggest
that they will arise more frequently in the future.1 '
This Note describes the court of appeals' response' 2 to ap-
peals brought while motions are still pending in the trial court
and considers the consequences of these decisions for district
courts, litigants, and for the court of appeals itself. Part I de-
scribes the mechanics of Rule 104.01 and its relationship to
other types of appellate rules and the policies of appellate juris-
rev'd in part, 452 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 1990); Iverson v. Iverson, 432 N.W.2d 492,
493 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 429 N.W.2d 689, 690
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1988);
Rigwald v. Rigwald, 423 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Edsten v. Ed-
sten, 407 N.W.2d 102, 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Fette v. Peterson, 406 N.W.2d
594, 596 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 406 N.W.2d 52, 53
(Mimi. Ct. App. 1987); Andersen v. Andersen, 376 N.W.2d 711, 716-17 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985); Cronin v. Cronin, 372 N.W.2d 778, 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985);
Brzinski v. Frederickson, 365 N.W.2d 291, 292 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Aben-
droth v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co., 363 N.W.2d 785,788
(Mimi. Ct. App. 1985); Lundeen v. Lappi, 361 N.W.2d 913, 917 (Mimi. Ct. App.
1985); Gummow v. Gummow, 356 N.W.2d 426,428 (Mini. Ct. App. 1984); Evans
v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). This list does not purport
to be exhaustive.
Events preceding the creation of Rule 104.01 foreshadowed some of the
difficulties it would cause. One commentator in the 1950s stated, "The number
of appeals dismissed as untimely indicates undue difficulty in complying with
this jurisdictional requirement." Note, Time to Appeal in Minnesota, 35 MINN.
L. REV. 640, 640 (1951).
10. See supra note 9.
11. In 1982, one observer noted that Minnesota's civil appellate caseload
had been growing approximately 11% per annum. John C. McCarthy, The
Civil Appellate Process in Minnesota, in MNNESOTA PRACTiCE METHODS: THE
APPELLATE PROCESS IN MINNEsOTA 1-2 (Advanced Legal Education, Hamline
University School of Law No. 285, July 26, 1982).
12. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the issues
of early appeals and missing or late rulings. The first decision of the court of
appeals on these issues was Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); see infra text accompanying notes 40-50. For a critical analysis of the
use of state supreme court authority in Evans v. Blesi, see infra note 46.
1046 [Vol. 76:1041
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diction. Part II argues that Rule 104.01 impedes the efficient
conduct of civil proceedings, is potentially unfair to appellants,
and frustrates fundamental policy objectives of appellate juris-
diction by interfering with the division of judicial labor be-
tween intermediate and lower courts. Part III considers
alternative ways of remedying the defects of the civil appeals
timing rule. It recommends that the Minnesota Supreme Court
explicitly interpret Rule 104.01 to permit trial courts to retain
jurisdiction to decide post-trial motions pending at the time of
appeal.
I. THE TIMING REQUIREMENT FOR APPEALS FROM
JUDGMENT IN MINNESOTA CIVIL COURTS
Rule 104.01 delimits the jurisdiction of the Minnesota
Court of Appeals. A critical evaluation of the rule requires un-
derstanding whether it effectively implements the policies of
appellate jurisdiction. This in turn requires understanding how
the timing rule functions in concert with other rules of civil
procedure as well as how courts have interpreted it.
A. APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN MINNESOTA
A division of judicial labor between trial and appellate
courts requires rules that define when one tribunal transfers a
case to another. One such rule followed in Minnesota and
many other jurisdictions is the final judgment rule. 3 In these
13. MINN. R. CIV. App. P. 103.03(a),(f); see Village of Roseville v. Sunset
Memorial Park Ass'n, 113 N.W.2d 857, 858 (Minn. 1962) (It is generally settled
that "appeals cannot be taken from any order or proceeding in the trial court
which is not final. The purpose of this rule is not only to conserve judicial en-
ergy but also to eliminate delays caused by interlocutory appeals."); see also
Weinzierl v. Lien, 209 N.W.2d 424, 424 (Minn. 1973) (noting that only orders
having the effect of finally determining the action or some positive legal right
of the appellant relating to the action are appealable).
The United States Supreme Court has defined a final decision of a federal
district court as one that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
for the court to do but execute the judgment." 9 MooRE ET AL., supra note 3,
110.07, at 39 (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-234 (1945)); see
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). A final decision on the merits adjudicates all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of the parties, or a whole claim for relief, or
the claims and liabilities of one of the parties. 9 MooRE ET AL., supra note 3,
110.08[1], at 45.
It is somewhat misleading to speak of a finality rule as though it repre-
sents a single proposition implemented in identical ways in all jurisdictions
purporting to reserve appellate jurisdiction to final judgment. See Paul D.
Carrington, Toward A Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, 47 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 165, 165. Although many jurisdictions "can be
10471992]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1041
jurisdictions, parties may not bring their cases to an appellate
court until the trial court has made a full and final disposition
of the substantive rights at stake in the litigation.
Commentators state that the major purpose of limiting ap-
pellate jurisdiction to final judgments and orders is conserva-
tion of judicial, social, and party resources.' 4 Resources are
economized in several ways. One source of savings results from
the removal of an incentive to the prevailing party to appeal
unfavorable orders and rulings that the court issued in the
course of the trial.15 Other savings are achieved by consolidat-
found to have embraced the wisdom that 'causes should not come up here in
fragments [or] successive appeals,' none has been discussed which has found
that wisdom to be a simple one to be forthrightly applied." Id. at 165 (quoting
Canter v. American Ins. Co., 28 U.S. 307, 318 (1830)); see also Maurice Rosen-
berg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, 47 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1984, at 171, 172 (describing the existing federal finality rules
as "a hodgepodge, a kind of crazy quilt of legislation and judicial decisions").
Many states, including Minnesota, have modeled their civil court rules on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Civil Appellate Procedure. The final
judgment rule serves the same goals as both Minnesota and federal civil rules:
"to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
FED. R. Civ. P. 1; MINN. R. CIV. P. 1.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective in 1938. See
WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 62, at 292. Since that time, over half of the states have
adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure virtually unchanged. Id. at 294.
Commentators claim every jurisdiction has revised its procedure to reflect the
federal rules in some way. Id.; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Comment on the Fed-
eralism of the Federal Rules, 1979 DuKE L.J. 843, 843.
States that have modeled their rules of civil procedure on the federal
rules include: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. See supra note 1 (listing state statutes); WRIGHT, supra note 1,
§ 62.
Federal courts apply the final judgment rule, except for interlocutory ap-
peals, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1988). See 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3,
§ 110.06, at 38. Not all jurisdictions employ the final judgment rule. New
York, for example, does not follow it. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 5601-5602,
5701-5703 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1992); see Jill Paradise Botler et al., Pro-
ject, The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York- An Empirical
Study of Its Powers and Functions as an Intermediate State Court, 47 FORD-
HLAM L. REVIEW 929, 930, 951-54 (1979). California, although formally employ-
ing the final judgment rule, has significantly broadened, by statute and judicial
decision, opportunities for interlocutory appeal. See Winslow Christian, Inter-
locutory Review in California-Practical Justice Unguided by Standards, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 111, 111-13.
14. See 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, 110.07, at 39-43; Rosenberg, supra
note 13, at 171; Gerald T. Wetherington, Appellate Review of Final and Non-
Final Orders in Flordia [sic] Civil Cases-An Overview, 47 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1984, at 61, 63-64.
15. On the other hand, judicial time also is lost when early review that
1048
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ing separate appeals as well as by allowing trial courts to pro-
ceed without interruption. Some commentators also contend
the policy contributes to the full and fair resolution of dis-
putes,'6 arguing that appellate review on a complete record of
lower court proceedings allows an appellate judge to gauge
more accurately the harm that the error in question actually
caused.
Jurisdictions that apply the final judgment rule to define
appellate court jurisdiction commonly set time limits for ap-
pealing trial court judgments and orders. Limiting access to ap-
pellate jurisdiction on the basis of time ensures finality by
forcing litigants to proceed to appeal or to accept the trial
court's decision. This policy fosters repose for the prevailing
party."' In addition, society benefits from the resolution of
conflicts.
Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 104.01 estab-
lishes when parties can appeal.' 8 Rule 103.03 lists the parties
who can appeal.19 Although Rule 103.03 permits interlocutory
appeals on questions that the trial court certifies as important
as well as appeals from injunctions and attachments, it largely
embodies the final judgment rule.20 Together, the two rules de-
fine the jurisdiction of the court of appeals.
would have brought the litigation to a prompt conclusion is delayed. See Ro-
senberg, supra note 13, at 171. Whenever appellate review could have cor-
rected a trial court error that later requires a new trial, delaying appellate
review wastes the trial court's time, not to mention that of the parties and thejury. lI&
16. 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 3, 110.07, at 39; Wetherington, supra
note 14, at 63-64; qf Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 171 (discussing the paradox
of "trying to promote promptness in disposing of cases by delaying appeals un-
til the end of the process instead of encouraging early appellate review").
17. The Supreme Court stated this policy as follows:
The purpose of the rule is clear. It is "to set a definite point of time
when litigation shall be at an end, unless within that time the pre-
scribed application has been made; and if it has not, to advise prospec-
tive appellees that they are freed of the appellant's demands. Any
other construction of the statute would defeat its purpose."
Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978)
(quoting Matton Steamboat Co. v. Murphy, 319 U.S. 412, 415 (1943)) (citations
omitted).
18. See supra note 5 (setting forth the text of Rule 104).
19. See MINN. R. Civ. ApP. P. 103.03 (listing the types of orders from
which "an appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals").
20. I&
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B. THE OPERATION OF MINNESOTA'S CIVIL APPEALS TIMING
RULE
1. The Jurisdictional Character of Rule 104.01
As is the case with federal courts, Minnesota courts con-
sider the civil appeal timing rule to be jurisdictional. 21 In MAin-
nesota, the perfection 22 of an appeal divests the trial court of
21. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that § 605.08 was jurisdictional in
Arndt v. Minnesota Educ. Ass'n, 134 N.W.2d 136, 137 (Minn. 1965). The court
decided that it had no authority except to dismiss an appeal taken after the
statutory time period had elapsed. The court did not elaborate further on the
meaning of appellate jurisdiction. See 2 MARK B. DUNNELL, MASON'S DUN-
NELL ON MINNESOTA PRACTICE § 3049, at 30-71 (H.F. Bartelt ed., 2d ed. 1952).
But see infra notes 46, 74.
Federal courts of appeal have jurisdiction over appeals from final deci-
sions of federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). For critical analyses of
the jurisdictional character of Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, see Adams, supra note 3; Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of
the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399, 399 & n.2 (1986).
22. To perfect an appeal in Minnesota, a party files notice of the appeal
with the clerk of the appellate court and serves the adverse party. MINN. R.
CIv. APP. P. 103.01. When the adverse party does not receive written notice of
an order, however, the time limit for appealing the order does not begin to
run. Nordeen v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 382 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986). Failure to serve an adverse party with notice of appeal results in
dismissal of the appeal with respect to parties not notified. Hansing v. Mc-
Groarty, 433 N.W.2d 441, 442 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). The appellate court does
not have jurisdiction to extend the time for appeal, even to cure defects in no-
tification. MINN. R. CIv. APP. P. 126.02.
One of the revisions to the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure resulted in
prohibiting appeals from an order for judgment and allowing only appeals
from an entered judgment. Larson, supra note 2, at 634-35. The revision thus
had the effect of disallowing appeals from a stayed order for entry of judg-
ment.
Because a judgment is not effective until entered under Rule 58.01 of Min-
nesota Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellate court may dismiss an appeal
taken prior to entry of judgment. Schaust v. Town Bd., 204 N.W.2d 646, 648
(Minn. 1973); State v. Howell, 359 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The
court may grant a discretionary review of a prematurely filed appeal in certain
circumstances, however. In Howell, the court granted discretionary review
when the trial court had issued a post-trial order which, in and of itself, was
not appealable but had not also ordered the entry of an amended judgment
which would have been appealable. 359 N.W.2d at 631.
Rule 77.04 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure orders the court ad-
ministrator to serve notice on all affected parties of the filing of an order, deci-
sion, or entry of judgment immediately upon doing so. The time limits on
taking an appeal are not affected, however, if the administrator fails to notify
the parties. MINN. R. CIv. P. 77.04. In Eisenberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 134 N.W.2d 144, 145 (Minn. 1965), the clerk failed to notify the plaintiff of
entry of judgment. The plaintiff did not learn of the entry of judgment until
after the time for appealing the judgment had run. Id. The plaintiff then
moved to vacate the judgment, which the court denied in an order that the
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jurisdiction on all matters except those collateral to the issues
on appeal2 and confers jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the appeal on the appellate court.24 District courts lack even
the power to correct inadvertent errors without leave from a
higher court. In addition, the court of appeals has held that
plaintiff then appealed. Id- Relying on Tombs v. Ashworth, 95 N.W.2d 423
(Minn. 1955), the court refused to vacate the nonappealable order, explaining
that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Eenberg, 134
N.W.2d at 145.
23. Jurisdictional terminology is also used in the 1983 comment to Rule
103, which prescribes procedures for taking an appeal. This comment pro-
vides: '"The notice of appeal served on both the adverse party and the clerk of
the trial court and filed with the clerk of the appellate courts is required in
order to vest jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals." MINN. R. Civ. App. P.
103.01 cmt.
Minnesota courts also have interpreted the time limits for filing post-trial
motions as jurisdictional. Weberg v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 59 N.W.2d
317, 320 (Minn. 1953) (trial court's jurisdiction to grant a motion for a new trial
expired at the end of the 60-day period specified in Rule 59.03). But see State
v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 31, 116 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 1962) (failure to
timely settle case after expiration of stay should not deprive party of right to
appeal); Crawford v. Woodrich Constr. Co., 51 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Minn. 1952)
(mutual mistake of parties excuses failure to make timely motion after expira-
tion of stay).
24. Minnesota's Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow parties to waive
subject matter jurisdiction or to consent to a court acting without subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 12.08(c). The court of appeals consist-
ently has equated its appellate jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction.
See Gummow v. Gummow, 356 N.W.2d 426,428 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Evans v.
Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); see also infra part H.C.
Although the perfection of an appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction as a
general rule, this rule is subject to exceptions. See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 81
N.W.2d 864, 866 (Minn. 1957) (trial court retains jurisdiction to decide if de-
fendant is entitled to a free transcript); Smith v. Condux Int'l, Inc., 466 N.W.2d
22, 25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (trial court has jurisdiction to enforce permanent
injunction that was part of the final judgment during appeal); David N.
Volkmann Constr., Inc. v. Isaacs, 428 N.W.2d 875, 876-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(trial court has jurisdiction over enforcement of the judgment while appeal is
pending, but not to modify or set aside its order on the merits); Fette v. Peter-
son, 406 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (on appeal, trial court retains
power to order prejudgment interest); Hasan v. McDonald's Corp., 377 N.W.2d
472, 473-74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court cannot order filing of depositions
on post-appeal stipulation of parties); Bio-Line, Inc. v. Wilfley, 365 N.W.2d 338,
341 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court retains jurisdiction over discovery during
appeal but could not dismiss counter claim which would have rendered appeal
moot). But see Hoyt Inv. Co. v. Bloomington Commerce & Trade Center As-
socs., 421 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Mim. Ct. App. 1988) (during pendency of appeal
from an extraordinary writ of the court of appeals, trial court does not have
jurisdiction to carry out the order).
25. The earliest reference to a post-appeal order of a trial court which was
declared null on appeal occurred in Kath v. Kath, 55 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Minn.
1952) (trial court memorandum to correct error in judgment which was made
nunc pro tunc a part of the order from which appeal was taken, issued after
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Minnesota's Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit parties from ob-
taining appellate court jurisdiction by waiver or consent.2 The
appellate court should sua sponte raise problems of jurisdiction,
including problems of timeliness.
Minnesota courts have applied Rule 104.01 strictly.2 The
court of appeals normally dismisses appeals filed prior to entry
of judgment or after expiration of the ninety-day period for
taking an appeal from judgment.28 Trial courts cannot extend
perfection of appeal, "is a nullity and cannot be considered on review since the
trial court had no jurisdiction of the cause when the memorandum was
made"); see Cronin v. Cronin, 372 N.W.2d 778, 782 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (not-
ing that a trial court may correct clerical errors with leave from the appellate
court under Rule 60.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure).
26. See Gummow v. Gummow, 356 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(interpreting Rule 12.08(c) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure). Appel-
late jurisdiction cannot be enlarged or conferred by the consent or stipulations
of parties. See Burns v. Stewart, 188 N.W.2d 760, 767 (Minn. 1971); State v.
Bentley, 28 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Miln.), later proceeding, 28 N.W.2d 770 (Minn.
1947).
27. The strict interpretation that courts give to Rule 104.01 with respect to
removing jurisdiction from the trial court parallels the interpretation of the
Rule with respect to obtaining appellate jurisdiction. Rule 103.03 is Minne-
sota's version of a finality rule. MINN. R. CIrv. App. P. 103.03. An order for
judgment that has not been entered is not final, on the theory that it may be
amended prior to entry. See Schaust v. Town BcL, 204 N.W.2d 646, 648 (Minn.
1973). Prematurely filed appeals must be dismissed. MINN. R. CV. APP. P.
104.01; see also State v. Howell, 359 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (not-
ing that, in general, an appeal before entry of judgment is premature).
28. This is a harsh result in light of the fact that an appellant has no right
to notice of entry of judgment. In Minnesota, a party cannot rely on the clerk
of the court for notification of the entry of judgment, even though Rule 77.04
of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure obliges the clerk to provide it. See
MiNN. R. Cirv. P. 77.04; Servin v. Servin, 345 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1984);
Schaust, 204 N.W.2d at 648; Swenson v. City of Fifty Lakes, 439 N.W.2d 758,
759 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Bongard v. Bongard, 342 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1983), later proceeding, 380 N.W.2d 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Recent
Cases, Lack of Knowledge of Entry of Judgement Not Ground for Reviving
Lost Right of Appeal, 44 MINN. L. REV. 186, 187 & nn.5-9 (1959). Because dis-
missal obliges appellants to refile the appeal once judgment is entered, the
rule creates a trap for unwary litigants. It is difficult to see any substantive
merit to this strict implementation of Rule 104.01, especially because appel-
lants generally refile identical papers.
The parallel federal rule is Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. In Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520, 523-24 (1944), the Supreme Court held
that a district court could vacate and re-enter a judgment to permit a party to
appeal when the court clerk failed to notify the parties of entry of judgment.
The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the state rule differently, holding
that a trial court could not extend the time period for appeal. See Eisenberg v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 134 N.W.2d 144, 145 (Minn. 1965). Later, the
Advisory Committee on amendments to the federal rules stated that Rule
77(d) was amended in order to avoid the Hill result. See FED. R. Civ. P. 77(d)
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the time within which a party may file an appeal.29
2. Differences Between Appealable and Unappealable Orders
After entry of judgment, a party may make motions seek-
ing trial court review or may appeal from judgment. The Min-
nesota Rules of Civil Procedure allow several motions for
securing trial court review.30 The rules prescribe strict time
limits for filing post-trial motions.3 ' Although the rules estab-
advisory committee's note, in 10 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) cxxxiii (1948) (dis-
cussing the 1946 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
29. Trial courts cannot vacate a judgment and re-enter it in order to ex-
tend the time to appeal. See, e.g., Eisenberg, 134 N.W.2d at 145 (appellant is
not entitled to have a valid judgment vacated in order to appeal the same judg-
ment when the trial court re-enters judgment). Trial courts also cannot mod-
ify a judgment in order to extend the time to appeal issues that a party could
have raised in an appeal from the original judgment. See Beeson v. Beeson,
432 N.W.2d 501, 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (unless a court modifies or amends
its decision on an issue involved in a judgment, an issue decided in a judgment
may not be raised on appeal from a modified or amended judgment).
A stay preventing entry of judgment would delay the start of the period
within which a party may file an appeal until the expiration of the stay. See
Weberg v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 59 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. 1953); Mc-
Kee-Johnson v. Johnson, 429 N.W.2d 689, 691 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd
on other grounds, 444 N.W.2d 259 (Minn. 1989).
30. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 50 (motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict); MINN. R. Civ. P. 52 (motion to amend findings or judgment); MINN. R.
CIV. P. 59 (motion for new trial); MIN. R. Civ. P. 60 (motion for relief from
judgment).
31. Rule 59.03 requires a party to serve notice of its motion within 15 days
after a general verdict and further obliges the trial court to hear the motion
within 30 days of the general verdict or within 30 days of service of notice by a
party. MINN. P. Civ. P. 59.03. When Minnesota first adopted the Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 59.03 required that motions for a new trial had to be
made within 60 days of the date of verdict or notice of the filing of the deci-
sion. Weberg, 59 N.W.2d at 319. The trial court may, however, extend this pe-
riod for good cause. MINN. R. Civ. P. 59.03. A stay of entry of judgment under
Rule 58 will not, however, extend the time within which a party may make
these motions. MINN. R. Crv. P. 59.06; see State v. Independent Sch. Dist. No.
31, 116 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn. 1962).
The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure also make other post-trial mo-
tions subject to the time limits Rule 59.03 imposes. The rules permit parties to
move that "judgment be entered notwithstanding the verdict or notwithstand-
ing the jury has disagreed and been discharged." MINN. R. Cirv. P. 50.02(1).
Parties must make these motions within the time limits of Rule 59.03. See
MINN. R. Civ. P. 50.02(3). Rule 52 motions to amend findings, make new find-
ings, or amend the judgment are subject to the same time constraints. Rule
60.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides an exception to the general rule.
Rule 60.02 creates a category of post-trial motions that is not subject to the
time limits of Rule 59.03 by permitting trial courts to relieve parties from final
judgment, order a new trial, or grant other relief because of mistakes, inadver-
tence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, and other similar
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lish a uniform time limit for making post-trial motions, orders
deciding certain post-trial motions are appealable while orders
denying others are not. Rule 103.03 defines which judgments
and orders are appealable as a matter of right.32 For example, a
ruling on a motion for a new trial is appealable3s Orders deny-
ing motions to vacate, to amend the judgment, or for a verdict
notwithstanding the judgment are not appealable.s4 Rule
104.01 requires a party to appeal from an order denying a mo-
tion for a new trial within thirty days of receiving notice.35
This time period runs independently of the period for appealing
from judgment. An appeal from an order denying a motion for
a new trial is not barred simply because the period for appeal-
ing from the judgment has run. 3 6
Rule 104.01 thus may force a party to appeal from a judg-
ment because an order denying a motion to amend or vacate
the judgment is not independently appealable. To preserve the
right to appeal in such situations, several courts have en-
reasons. MINN. R. Civ. P. 60.02. Through the operation of 60.02, a trial court
could vacate an order or judgment, and then, because no judgment existed, or-
der a new trial. Id In this way, a party may obtain a new trial well after the
time that Rule 59.03 allows. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 60.02 advisory committee's
note; Nordeen v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 382 N.W.2d 256, 259-60 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986).
32. MINN. R. Cxv. App. P. 103.03. Rule 105.01 empowers the court of ap-
peals to permit a party to appeal from any order, except those made during
trial, even if not appealable as a matter of right. MN R. Civ. APP. P. 105.01.
In addition to those orders and rulings which parties have a right to appeal,
the court of appeals has discretion under Rule 105.01 to allow parties to appeal
otherwise nonappealable orders. Parties seeking appeal under Rule 105.01
must file a petition within 30 days of the filing of the order. MINN. &. Cirv. P.
105.01 cmt.
33. MmN. R. Cirv. App. P. 103.03; see, eg., Iverson v. Iverson, 432 N.W.2d
492, 493 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (denial of motion for a new trial is appealable
within 30 days after service of the adverse party with written notice of the or-
der's filing).
34. See, e.g., In re R.M. & C.M., 436 N.W.2d 807, 808 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(motions to reconsider, vacate, or amend do not extend the time to appeal a
final order); Beeson v. Beeson, 432 N.W.2d 501, 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (or-
der denying post-trial motion for amended findings is not appealable). The
reasoning behind the rule is that if a judicial error can be corrected by an ap-
peal from judgment, the rules do not permit another method to be used to ob-
tain review. Nordeen, 382 N.W.2d at 259 (order denying post-trial motion to
vacate the judgment is not appealable).
35. MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01.
36. See, e.g., Iverson, 432 N.W.2d at 493 (denial of a motion for a new trial
is separately appealable, and the appeal period is independent of 'he time to
appeal from judgment); Alholm v. Wilt, 348 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (citing Honeymead Prods. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 132 N.W.2d
741, 743 (Minn. 1965)).
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couraged parties always to include a new trial motion in their
post-trial motions because an order denying a new trial motion
is independently appealable3 7 and commences its own distinct
time period for appeal.
3. Enforcement of Rule 104.01 in the Court of Appeals
Despite the existence of a procedural technique for avoid-
ing late or missing rulings, the court of appeals still encounters
appellants who have not employed it. 3s Soon after the creation
of the intermediate court of appeals in Minnesota,3 9 the poten-
tial problem of Rule 104.01 became an actual issue.
In Evans v. Blesi,4° Evans claimed that his business partner
Blesi breached a fiduciary duty, and he sued Blesi for damages
and reinstatement in the corporation.4 ' After the court entered
judgment for Evans, Blesi made several post-trial motions, in-
cluding motions to amend provisions of the judgment, the dam-
37. When no trial has occurred, and a motion for a new trial is therefore
inappropriate, a party may request that the trial court stay the entry of judg-
ment until it resolves all post-trial motions. See MINN. R. CIv. P. 58.02; Ama-
tuzio v. Amatuzio, 431 N.W.2d 588, 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
38. The technique of including a new trial motion is obviously inappropri-
ate if no trial has taken place. After a trial, this tactic preserves the right to
appeal, however long the district court takes to decide the motions. Although
counsel may use a new trial motion strategically to avoid the potentially dam-
aging consequences of Rule 104.01, this is a less-than-perfect solution for a
number of reasons. It creates a trap for appellants who are unaware of the
insurance value of a new trial motion. Further, a party who makes a new trial
motion for strategic purposes might not have made the same motion in an ap-
peal from the judgment following reception of the trial court's rulings on the
accompanying motions. In addition, requiring parties to make an additional
motion because the trial court might render a tardy ruling imposes additional
and possibly avoidable costs on litigants. Finally, because of the potential un-
certainty as to whether a particular motion substantively falls into the cate-
gory of an appealable motion, attorneys might make unnecessary motions for a
new trial.
In one case, the appeals court urged the parties to "exhaust their remedy
of review in the trial court before initiating an appeal." Coady v. Jurek, 366
N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). Waiting until the penultimate day of
the period for appealing from judgment, however, only cures the problem of
"early" appeals, not "late" or "missing" rulings. See Amatuzio, 431 N.W.2d at
590 ("If post-trial motions are pending, parties should avoid filing an appeal,
where possible, before resolution of the motions.").
39. In 1982, the Minnesota Legislature passed a statute creating the court
of appeals. See Court of Appeals Act, ch. 501, 1982 Minn. Laws 569; MNN.
STAT. §§ 480A.01-.11 (1982). The new court began accepting filings in August
1983. See Larson, supma note 2, at 639-40.
40. 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
41. Id- at 777.
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age awards, and the order to reinstate Evans.42 The trial court
did not decide these motions within ninety days from entry of
judgment, forcing Blesi to appeal.43 By the time the appellate
court considered Blesi's appeal, the trial court had issued orders
setting aside Evans's reinstatement and reducing damages on
the basis that the conduct of Evans's attorney unfairly influ-
enced the jury's award of damages.44
In considering the legal status of the trial court's post-ap-
peal orders, the Evans court noted an "apparent anomaly" in
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.45 The court
observed that one consequence of Rule 104.01 was that "an or-
der that is not really late, if entered after an appeal is taken, is
of no effect."
Despite holding that the district court's late order had no
legal effect, the appellate court nonetheless relied heavily on
it.4 7 The court noted the trial court's "unique position" 4 for
42. Id at 778.
43. Id.
44. I& at 780.
45. I&
46. Id. In holding the trial court's post-appeal order null, the court of ap-
peals cited Kath v. Kath, 55 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1952), for the proposition that
"[tihe jurisdiction over the subject matter of defendants' motions had shifted
from the district court to the Court of Appeals at the time of filing of the no-
tice of appeal." Evans, 345 N.W.2d at 780. Kath, however, does not contain
such broad language, nor is its holding concerning trial court jurisdiction after
appeal relevant to the issue presented in Evans v. Blesi. In Kath, the trial
court issued an order denying a post-trial motion for a new trial which the
plaintiff appealed. Kath, 55 N.W.2d at 693. The trial court then filed a memo-
randum purporting to amend the original order. The Minnesota Supreme
Court held the memorandum to be null. Id. In Evans v. Blesi, the court of
appeals interpreted Kath to hold that, once a party appeals, trial courts lack
jurisdiction to decide post-trial motions made before appeal. 345 N.W.2d at
780. Kath, however, did not involve undecided post-trial motions on appeal.
The court of appeals also has interpreted State v. Barnes, 81 N.W.2d 864
(Minn. 1957), to require divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over "those
matters necessarily involved in the appeal" on perfection of an appeal. State v.
Patrick, 348 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). In cases involving early ap-
peals and missing or late rulings, the court of appeals has not relied on
Barnes; see supra note 9. Nevertheless, Patrick suggests that the court of ap-
peals alternatively could anchor its holding in Evans v. Blesi on Barnes instead
of Kath. Like Kath, however, Barnes does not concern an early appeal or miss-
ing or late rulings. Rather, it concerns whether a trial court retains jurisdic-
tion to decide a motion that a party makes qfter appealing. Barnes, 81 N.W.2d
at 865-66. Read in light of their specific facts, neither Kath nor Barnes re-
quires the interpretation the court of appeals gives Rule 104.01 in Evans v.
Blesi. See infra part II.C.
47. Evans, 345 N.W.2d at 780.
48. Id.; see also United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1278-79 (7th Cir.
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evaluating the consequences of alleged misconduct by plain-
tiff's counsel49 and specifically followed the trial court's deter-
mination of the prejudicial effect of the conduct on the jury's
determination of punitive and compensatory damages.5°
In subsequent opinions, the court of appeals has followed
Evans v. Blesi, holding post-appeal orders null while nonethe-
less taking cognizance of the trial court's results.51 Some opin-
1987) ('"Ikal judges have a comparative advantage because they alone see all
the evidence in context, and the judicial system as a whole takes advantage of
the division of labor.") (Easterbrook, J.).
49. Evans, 345 N.W.2d at 780.
50. I& at 779-81. In its post-appeal order, the trial court ordered remitti-
tur of punitive damages from $500,000 to $250,000. The appellate court simi-
larly lowered punitive damages to $250,000.
51. This method of handling a late ruling has much to commend it. Trial
courts have experience in conducting trials as well as knowledge of the man-
ner in which witnesses and counsel comport themselves. In addition, trial
judges know their own thought processes. This is particularly important when
they do not comprehensively explain their findings and conclusions. Clearly, a
substantive treatment of post-trial motions requiring additional fact-finding or
a reweighing of the evidence is particularly within the competence of the trial
court.
It is also preferable for the trial court to decide post-trial motions without
the disruptive intervention of an appeal, which, if it succeeds, likely may re-
sult only in the appellate court remanding the case for a new trial. In addition
to consuming judicial and party resources, a new trial may yield a less accurate
result than trial court review because the greater the passage of time from the
events being litigated, the greater the likelihood that memories will fade and
witnesses will become unavailable.
In Lundeen v. Lappi, 361 N.W.2d 913 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), a purchaser of
shorefront property sued the seller and real estate broker for misrepresenta-
tion. Id at 914. Defendants appealed the judgment for Lundeen after having
filed a motion for amended findings. IM at 915. The trial court ordered the
judgment amended after the filing of the appeal so as to disallow the attorney
fees and expenses granted in the original judgment. I& The appellate court
held the order null. Id. at 917. Although the appellate court did not explicitly
endorse the trial court's order in its decision, it came to the same conclusion.
Id.
The court in Abendroth v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty
Co., 363 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), held that the trial court lacked the
power to amend its findings after the plaintiff appealed from judgment. Id. at
788. The court nonetheless adopted the trial court's amended findings, stating
the trial court's amendment had "undisputed merit." I. The trial court ap-
parently had overlooked the waiver of a term of the insurance contract in its
original ruling.
In Brzinski v. Frederickson, 365 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), a hus-
band moved to amend provisions of a dissolution decree. Id at 292. After the
trial court issued an amended order, his wife moved for a new trial, a more
complete hearing or, in the alternative, more specific factual findings. Id
Before the trial court ruled, the wife appealed, rendering the trial court's sub-
sequent order null. Id Because the affidavits did not supply enough informa-
tion and because no testimony was taken during trial, the court of appeals
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ions, however, suggest the court is dissatisfied with its approach
of tacitly relying on legally null rulings.52
An appellate court faced with an early appeal 53 or missing
ruling54 potentially has the option of remanding the case to the
trial court for a decision on the post-trial motion. The court of
appeals rejected this possibility in Amatuzio v. Amatuzio."s
The Amatuzio court held that the rules did not authorize a
summary dismissal of an appeal in order to confer jurisdiction
on the trial court to decide pending motions.5
remanded the case to the trial court to hold a second hearing on the issue. Id
at 293. The trial court in this case simply did not provide any findings for the
appellate court to consider.
Andersen v. Andersen, 376 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), involved an
action to partition a family farm. While the trial court considered various
post-trial motions by the parties, one party filed an appeal. Id at 714. Some
months later, the trial court issued amended findings, conclusions of law, or-
der for judgment, and judgment and decree. Id The court denied a motion
for a new trial and all other motions. Id. The appellate court confronted the
issue of whether the post-appeal order of the trial court had any legal effect.
Id at 716-17. Following Evans v. Blesi, the court held the order null and void,
but because "the trial court was in a position to re-examine the judgment and
properly rectified the error," the court ordered the judgment amended as the
trial court had attempted to do. Id- at 717.
In Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 406 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), an appel-
late court held a trial court's post-appeal modification of a restraining order
void. The court cited Evans v. Blesi as authority for taking cognizance of the
trial court's modification order for the insight offered. Id at 54.
The most recent case in which an appellate court has taken judicial cogni-
zance of a post-appeal order of a trial court is Schmidt v. Apple Valley Health
Care Ctr., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). Although the appellate
court did not give effect to the post-appeal order, it reasoned that it clarified
the basis for the trial court's damage calculations and relied on it for that spe-
cific purpose. Id at 352.
52. See, e.g., Nordeen v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 382 N.W.2d 256, 260
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (noting "there is indeed good sense in permitting the
trial court to correct its own error and, if it refuses, in allowing a timely ap-
peal from the refusal" (quoting Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 531 (2d Cir.
1964))); Coady v. Jurek, 366 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that it is "unacceptable to demand that a party appeal the judgment and
forego review by the trial judge").
53. If a party appeals too early in the 90-day period for the trial court to
have an opportunity to rule on post-trial motions, the court may consider it an
early appeal. See supra note 8.
54. A missing ruling results when the running of the 90-day time period
forces a party to appeal before the trial court has ruled on post-trial motions.
See supra note 9.
55. 431 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
56. In Amatuzio, the court denied respondent's request to remand the ap-
peal to permit the trial court to rule on the respondent's pending motion for
amended findings. Id at 590. Although the appellate court embraced the pol-
icy of giving the trial court an opportunity to undertake review of its own ac-
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Alternatively, an appellant could attempt to avoid a miss-
ing or late ruling by requesting a stay from the court of appeals.
In Gummow v. Gummow,57 the appellate court granted a stay
on the appeal to give the trial court time to decide a post-trial
motion.-s The trial court still had not ruled on the motion at
the expiration of the stay, and the appellate court refused a mo-
tion to grant an extension.59
Although the appellate court offered no explanation for its
refusal, several concerns readily justify the result. Establishing
stays as a mechanism for curing late or missing rulings unfairly
places the burden on appellants to accommodate dilatory trial
court review and tacitly encourages such practices. Amatuzio
further suggests that, just as remanding a case for a missing
ruling violates appellate jurisdiction, so too would the granting
of stays for this purpose. In addition, a stay cures missing rul-
ings but does not resolve problems with rulings issued while
the court of appeals is considering the case. A stay also con-
sumes judicial and party resources while contributing nothing
to the litigation itself.
II. THE DEFECTS OF RULE 104.01
A. INEFFICIENT USE OF JUDICIAL AND PARTY RESOURCES
The court of appeals' use of post-appeal district court rul-
ings clearly indicates that it values district court results despite
their legal nullity.60 Although the court of appeals has not ex-
tions before any appeal was made, it held that the rules gave it no authority to
do so. Id- at 589-90.
57. 356 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). This case involved a dissolution
proceeding. Gary Gummow moved for amended findings, which the trial court
granted in part by amending the judgment. Id. at 428. Before the trial court
issued its amended findings, however, Gary filed an appeal. Id- Both parties
agreed to Gary's request to the appellate court to stay the appeal to permit the
trial court to rule on the motion. IM. The appellate court granted the stay, but
the trial court had not ruled on the motion at the expiration of the stay. I&.
The appellate court denied a request for another stay. I& Five months after
the expiration of the stay, the trial court ordered that the judgment be
amended. Id- Rosanne Gummow appealed the amended judgment, claiming
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to amend. I&
In ruling on the appeal, the court did not explicitly acknowledge the trial
court's post-appeal ruling. The trial court's amended findings increased the
share of marital property awarded to Gary Gummow. I& The appellate court
reversed and remanded, indicating several considerations which required that
Gary receive a larger share. Id, at 429.
58. Id- at 428.
59. Id
60. See Schmidt v. Apple Valley Health Care Ctr., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 349,
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plicitly instructed district courts to rule on motions despite the
district court's loss of jurisdiction on appeal, its repeated use of
legally null findings encourages district courts to make them.
Considered from the perspective of an ongoing judicial sys-
tem, the approach is not beneficial for several reasons. First, to
the extent that the policy of judicial recognition of late results
evades the strictures of Rule 104.01, the use of null findings is
implicitly critical of the rule.
Second, the practice of considering a late district court rul-
ing is not consistent with the court of appeals' other statements
about the relative values of late and missing rulings. By taking
cognizance of late results, the appellate court indicates that it
values trial court results highly enough to consider them de-
spite their null legal status. Decisions that refuse to grant a
stay to obtain rulings on post-trial motions,6 1 however, indicate
that the rulings are not important enough for the appellate
court to wait. Thus, district courts face conflicting signals on
how to manage their dockets. 'They cannot allocate their ef-
forts efficiently when they do not know the relative valuations
which appellate courts place on post-appeal trial court rulings.
Third, the prospect that a district court may not decide a
post-trial motion when the appellate court considers an appeal
injects additional uncertainty into the litigation decisions of
parties. If appellants are aware of the risk of missing rulings,
their estimates of the expected benefits of making post-trial
motions is affected. Some wary but risk averse appellants will
insure themselves against late or missing rulings by including a
new trial motion in their post-trial motions. Others more con-
cerned with cost will elect to forgo post-trial motions. Uncer-
tainty thus can impose real costs in the form of otherwise
unnecessary new trial motions and forfeitures of post-trial
motions.
Fourth, party and judicial resources are wasted when dis-
trict courts conduct hearings but fail to rule before the appel-
352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Andersen v. Andersen, 376 N.W.2d 711, 716-17
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Abendroth v. National Farmers Union, 363 N.W.2d 785,
788 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Lundeen v. Lappi, 361 N.W.2d 913, 917 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985); Gummow v. Gummow, 356 N.W.2d 426, 428-29 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 780 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). But see
Rudnitski v. Seely, 441 N.W.2d 827, 829, 831 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that
trial court's post-appeal order contained error of law), qff'd in part rev'd in
part, 452 N.W.2d 664 (Minn. 1990); Brzinski v. Frederickson, 365 N.W.2d 291,
293 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting trial court's post-appeal order because the
record did not contain the order's factual basis).
61. See Gummow, 356 N.W.2d at 428.
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late court considers the appeal. It is also inefficient to require
litigants to prepare for both a trial court and an appellate court
proceeding when a trial court ruling might obviate the appeal
entirely.
B. UNFAIRNESS TO APPELLANTS
1. Trial Compared to Appellate Review
Unwary appellants may find themselves forced to abandon
their post-trial motions. In effect, Rule 104.01 creates a trap for
the unwary and is at least a nuisance for the wary. The timing
rule62 makes the premature transfer of jurisdiction possible and
thus exposes appellants to potential unfairness by depriving
them of the trial court's ruling.
Appellate review is not a substitute for trial court review
of factual findings.63 An appellate court will not set aside the
factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly errone-
ous,64 while the trial court's review of its own findings is de
novo.63 Trial court review also is preferable to appellate court
review because the trial judge reviews from the vantage point
of a participant and observer of the entire litigation.66
For questions of law, the differences between appellate
court and trial court are less pronounced because appellate re-
view of issues of law is de novo.6 7 Still, appellants may value
62. See supra notes 1, 5 and accompanying text.
63. This is reflected in the fact that appeals courts generally show great
deference to a trial court's factual findings. Professional litigators note that
the chance an appeal will succeed is low, about 20%, and that an appeal is
more likely to succeed when it involves issues of law rather than fact. See
Thomas W. Tinkham, Appeals-Procedure and Practice, in CIVIL TRIAL PRAC-
TICE 281-84 (Advanced Legal Education, Hamline University School of Law
No. 232, May 31-June 1, 1984); see also McCarthy, supra note 11, at 7 (explain-
ing that reversals and even modifications of trial court decisions are rare on
appeal).
64. Trial court judges, for example, simply can decide that they erred in
weighing factors relevant to deciding an issue. An appellate court cannot de-
cide that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to weigh the evidence
properly. Rather, it must determine that the trial court findings are palpably
against the weight of the evidence. See, e.g., MINN. R. Ciw. P. 52.01; Estate of
Serbus v. Serbus, 324 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 1982); Reserve Mining Co. v.
State, 310 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 1981); Coady v. Jurek, 366 N.W.2d 715, 718
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
65. See MINN. R. Crv. P. 52.02; McCauley v. Michael, 256 N.W.2d 491, 500
(Minn. 1977).
66. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Nichols v. Meilahn, 444 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
("'[A]n appellate court need not give deference to a trial court's decision on a
legal issue.' Therefore, we review the trial court's ruling de novo." (quoting
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the trial court's superior familiarity with factual and eviden-
tiary issues, particularly when questions of law are intertwined
with issues of fact on appeal.68
Rule 104.01 also may harm appellants by depriving them of
post-trial rulings to use in preparing an appeal.69 A ruling
could provide information which would assist in strengthening
an appeal. On review, the trial judge might identify precedents,
interpretations, or issues that the post-trial motions, briefs, and
oral arguments of the parties failed to take into account but
which could be argued or challenged in the appeal. In addition,
the ruling might expose trial court errors by more clearly re-
vealing the reasoning of the trial judge and the factors the
judge considered in deciding the post-trial motion. Finally, ap-
peals obviously cannot address objections to a post-trial ruling
not yet made.
The trial court ruling may be significant in another, more
subtle sense, in that it could influence the appellate judge's un-
derstanding of the issues involved on appeal.70 If the record
more completely reflects the trial judge's reasoning, it will pro-
vide the appellate court with a more comprehensive view of the
course of lower court proceedings and the significance of facts
and issues involved in the appeal. The detrimental effects of
Rule 104.01 on appellants may be especially significant in cases
involving complex factual and legal issues in which the appel-
late court lacks the trial court's familiarity with the case.
C. RULE 104.01's JURIsDIcTIoNAL EFFECTS
If Rule 104.01 were solely a procedural rule, criticisms of
inefficiency and unfairness probably would suffice to condemn
it. 71 Because the rule has jurisdictional significance, 72 however,
Frost-Benco Elec. Ass'n v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642
(Minn. 1984))).
68. In many cases, because the trial court could correct errors of law on
its own review, it is inefficient to have the appellate court preempt trial court
review.
69. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
70. The significance of this concern depends on the extent to which ap-
peals from original judgments rely on the grounds identical to those the party
would assert on denial of a post-trial judgment.
71. The Minnesota Supreme Court commented on this problem:
Limitations upon the time for bringing an appeal, and logically like-
wise upon the power of the court to modify its judgments and orders
during such period, are to be liberally interpreted to avoid a forfeiture
of either the right of appeal or of the right to the exercise of such
power of modification.
Gelin v. Hollister, 24 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 1946).
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it is not so easily dismissed. It is therefore necessary to con-
sider the timing rule in relation to the policies underlying ap-
pellate jurisdiction.
In interpreting Rule 104.01's jurisdictional consequences,
Minnesota courts were faced with three basic options: they
could have likened appellate jurisdiction to personal jurisdic-
tion; they could have modeled it after subject matter jurisdic-
tion; or they could have distinguished appellate jurisdiction
from either of the other two types of jurisdiction.7 3 The court
of appeals consistently has followed the second option and held
that Rule 104.01 defines its subject matter jurisdiction.7 4 In do-
ing so, the court of appeals has failed to appreciate that the pol-
icies of appellate jurisdiction significantly differ from those of
subject matter jurisdiction and require different means to effec-
tuate them.
The courts were correct in refusing to interpret appellate
jurisdiction on the model of personal jurisdiction. Personal ju-
risdiction concerns the authority of the court over parties.75
Rule 12.08(a) of Minnesota's Rules of Civil Procedure allows
parties to consent to or to challenge the trial court's authority
over them.76 If a party fails to raise the lack of personal juris-
diction in the course of the pleadings, the defense is waived. 77
The concept of consent is appropriate when the issue is
whether a court has authority over a party, but it is irrelevant
72. "The limitation of time is so far jurisdictional that the parties cannot
waive the objection or by st[i]pulation clothe the supreme court with authority
to determine a belated appeal." 2 DUNNELL, supra note 21, § 3050, at 30-74.
73. For a discussion of the distinctive character of appellate jurisdiction,
see Hall, supra note 21, at 407-08 (arguing that the timing and notice provi-
sions for appeal render it more analogous to personal jurisdiction than to sub-
ject matter jurisdiction).
74. In Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), the court of
appeals relied on Kath v. Kath, 55 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1952), in interpreting
Rule 104.01 as defining its subject matter jurisdiction so as to remove trial
court jurisdiction over post-trial motions pending at the time of appeal. Evans,
345 N.W.2d at 780. The decision in Kath held that a trial judge could not
amend, after appeal, a ruling on a post-trial motion. Kath, 55 N.W.2d at 693.
In Kath, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether,
after appeal, trial court jurisdiction continued over pending post-trial motions,
nor did the court use the phrase "subject matter jurisdiction." Opinions by the
court of appeals subsequent to Evans v. Blesi follow its interpretation of Rule
104.01 as encompassing subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rigwald v.
Rigwald, 423 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Gummow v. Gummow,
356 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
75. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 11 (1990).
76. See MNN. R. Civ. P. 12.08(a).
77. Id.
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to an appeal proceeding which appellants have as a matter of
right. Rule 12.08(a) also gives the trial court no responsibility
for noticing a lack of personal jurisdiction. An appellate court,
in a court system based on the policy of finality, must play an
active role in ensuring that only timely appeals of final orders
and judgments receive appellate review.
The courts have failed to see that appellate jurisdiction also
has as little in common with subject matter jurisdiction as does
personal jurisdiction.78 Appellate jurisdiction defines a division
of judicial labor between the appellate and trial courts in the
adjudication of a case. In contrast, the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of a court system is the power to decide a dispute. Subject
matter jurisdiction may involve allocating cases to the appropri-
ate kind of court within that system; for example, a state's juve-
nile or criminal court. The subject matter jurisdiction of
Minnesota's district courts is absolute in the sense that parties
cannot waive it, and the court can bring up a defect of subject
matter jurisdiction and dismiss the action at any time.79 When
the goal is to limit the power of trial courts to certain kinds of
cases, it is reasonable to make jurisdiction noticeable by the
court sua sponte and not subject to the consent of the parties.
The policies underlying the subject matter jurisdiction of a
court system, however, are irrelevant to policies that determine
when a higher court takes power from a lower court over a case
within a court system. Appellate court jurisdiction concerns ju-
dicial function, not judicial authority.8 0 The court of appeals
has interpreted Rule 104.01 in a way that allows for the prema-
78. Commentators, however, have recognized the distinction. See, eg., Ro-
senberg, supra note 13, at 172 (explaining the inappropriateness of analogizing
the jurisdictional character of the finality requirement to subject matter juris-
diction based on diversity and amount in controversy).
79. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 12.08; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h) (incorporating
provisions having the same effect as the Minnesota rule).
80. Some commentators strongly urge eliminating jurisdictional concepts
from finality-appealability rules and appeal timing provisions. See Hall, supra
note 21, at 399-400; Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 173.
In federal courts, a motion to amend findings of fact "in more than purely
formal or mechanical aspects" tolls the time for taking an appeal. Leishman v.
Associated Wholesale Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 203, 206 (1943) (holding that filing of
a motion to amend "deprived the judgment of that finality which is essential
to appealability" because the motion involved issues of substance as well as al-
teration of rights that the trial court had determined).
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has articulated the policy behind its posi-
tion as follows:
"[No good purpose is served by requiring the parties to appeal to a
higher court, often requiring remand for further trial proceedings,
when the trial court is equally able to correct its decision in the light
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ture transfer of jurisdiction from trial to appellate court.8 1 It is
possible to interpret Rule 104.01 to avoid that result. For exam-
ple, the Rule could be read to require only the filing of a notice
of appeal within ninety days of entry of judgment, leaving the
trial court with authority to decide post-trial motions then
pending.8 2 By failing to distinguish appellate jurisdiction from
subject matter jurisdiction, the judiciary has imposed rigid and
mechanical concepts derived from subject matter jurisdiction
on a problem of a very different kind, thereby causing
problems of inefficiency and unfairness.
D. RULE 104.01 IS NOT JUSTIFMD AS A TIMING DEVICE
Rule 104.01 cannot be defended from these criticisms on
the grounds that, despite these defects, it nonetheless serves an
important control function as a timing device. With missing
rulings, Rule 104.01 has a major failing. It penalizes parties
who cannot effectively control the pace of district court pro-
ceedings. Although the rule does force parties to initiate fur-
ther proceedings on the penalty of automatically terminating
the litigation, the court of appeals' interpretation of the Rule
83
unnecessarily divests trial courts of authority to rule on post-
trial motions.
of new authority on application made within the time permitted for
appeal."
Nordeen v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 382 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986) (quoting Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 531 (2d Cir. 1964)).
81. See supra note 9 (citing court of appeals decisions which have inter-
preted Rule 104 in this manner).
82. Federal courts and state courts with timing rules similar to Rule 4(a)
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, are more efficient in this regard:
[I]f the motion did not hold matters in status quo the machinery of
appellate procedures will move forward with respect to the judgment
appealed from.. . [Tihe court will docket the appeal and instruct
plaintiff on the mechanics he must follow. Plaintiff must notify the
court reporter to prepare a transcript and make financial arrange-
ments for it. When the transcript is completed the clerk of the dis-
trict court will prepare and file the record in the appellate court.
The time then begins to run for the filing of briefs.... [D]elays in
briefing may have to be asked to see what happens to the motion
pending in the district court, which leaves the case dead in the water
in the court of appeals. Some, or all, of this effort may have to be can-
celled, or supplemented, or done over again once the new trial motion
has been disposed of.
Martin v. Campbell, 692 F.2d 112, 115 (11th Cir. 1982).
83. See suprm note 60 (citing cases).
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III. REMEDIES FOR THE DEFECTS OF RULE 104.01
Various approaches are possible for reducing or eliminating
the inefficiency and unfairness that Rule 104.0184 causes. The
approaches attempt a more adequate recognition of the distinc-
tive nature of appellate jurisdiction. A satisfactory treatment
of appellate jurisdiction based on the final judgment rule re-
quires that jurisdiction remain in the trial court until it rules
on all challenges to the judgment within its competence to
decide.
Methods of remedying Rule 104.01's harmful effects can be
roughly divided into two groups: proposals that restructure the
appeal process to avoid the harmful results of Rule 104.01, and
proposals providing remedies that do not significantly alter cur-
rent procedures. A proposal that allows an appeal from judg-
ment after the trial court rules on post-trial motions belongs in
the first category. Setting time limits for trial court decisions
on post-trial motions, permitting extension of the time to ap-
peal from judgment, and interpreting Rule 104.01 to allow trial
courts to retain jurisdiction to decide post-trial motions fit into
the second category.
If the rules of civil appellate procedure were susceptible to
significant restructuring, it would be possible to adopt the ap-
proach taken in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and
in Minnesota's Rules of Criminal Procedure. These rules allow
an appeal from judgment for a limited time after issuance of an
order denying a motion to amend or vacate the judgment, for
additional findings of fact, or for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. This approach would eliminate the problems of miss-
ing and late rulings without adding any additional procedural
steps. Unfortunately, it would require a major legislative revi-
sion of the Rules. A simpler but slightly less efficient solution
would require the state supreme court to take up a case involv-
ing a late ruling or early appeal and explicitly interpret Rule
104.01 to allow trial courts to retain jurisdiction to decide post-
trial motions. The greater feasibility of this solution makes it
more attractive than the former, despite its somewhat less per-
fect results.
84. Because the reasons for the Civil Appellate Rules Advisory Commit-
tee's failure to follow the federal scheme relate to the statutory definition of
appellate jurisdiction, any revision of Rule 104.01 to cure its defects would
likely have to be made by the Legislature. See supra note 2.
1066 [Vol. 76:1041
UNAPPEA.LING TIMING
A. ALLOWING APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT AFTER TRIAL COURT
RULINGS ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
This solution permits, for a limited time, appeal from judg-
ment after the trial court makes a ruling on post-trial motions,
such as motions to amend or vacate the judgment, to make new
findings of fact, to request a new trial, or to ask for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.a5 Currently, a party must make a
new trial motion to secure appellate review in the event the
trial court does not decide the post-trial motions before the
ninety-day period for appeal from judgment runs.s6 The ap-
proach proposed here would eliminate the need for parties to
insure themselves of an opportunity for appellate review by
making otherwise unnecessary new trial motions. This ap-
proach avoids late or missing rulings because parties are not
forced to appeal from judgment before the trial court disposes
of the motions.87
This solution does not prevent early appeals, but early ap-
peals are very infrequent.8 8 In addition to implementing the fi-
nal judgment rule more effectively by avoiding missing and late
rulings, extending the time period for appealing from judgment
in this way does not require extra procedural steps. By follow-
ing the approach taken in federal appellate and criminal appeal
proceedings, this solution would have the salutary effect of
bringing Minnesota's Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure into
conformity with other appeal proceedings. However, because it
requires a significant restructuring of a process the state legis-
lature and bar long ago became accustomed to, it may not be a
feasible solution.
B. EXTENSION OF THE TIME TO APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
Another possible solution would permit parties to consent
to or petition for continued trial court jurisdiction until the
trial court has decided all motions attacking the judgment.8 9
85. This recommendation excludes renewing the appeal from judgment
on denial of Rule 60 post-trial motions to correct clerical errors or to make al-
lowances for mistakes, excusable neglect, or newly discovered evidence.
86. See Amatuzio v. Amatuzio, 431 N.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988).
87. Another benefit of this approach is that litigants will no longer forgo
an appeal from judgment because they mistakenly believe they can appeal
from an order denying the post-trial motion they have made. See, e.g., Beeson
v. Beeson, 432 N.W.2d 501, 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
88. See supra note 8.
89. Allowing parties to consent to continuing trial court jurisdiction does
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Allowing petition by either party alone, or both jointly, how-
ever, poses the problem that parties may perceive their advan-
tage to lie in forcing an appeal. Respondents could strategically
waive or withhold their consent to waiver in order to cut off
trial court review when doing so would be advantageous. Ap-
pellants are less likely to see an advantage to withholding their
consent, but the possibility exists.
This approach also adds another procedural step, thereby
placing a burden on litigants more appropriately placed on the
court. The fatal shortfall of extension by petition is that if no
request is made, or if it is made and denied, appellate jurisdic-
tion is not postponed, and all the problems of the timing rule
remain. Revising the rule of appellate jurisdiction in this way
does not establish functional appellate jurisdiction.
C. TIME LIMIT ON TRIAL COURT RULINGS
A different approach from remand or waiver would intro-
duce a requirement that trial courts decide all potentially rele-
vant post-trial motions within ninety days from entry of
judgment. ° In fact, a statute 91 requires the court of appeals to
rule on post-judgment motions within ninety days.92 Trial
court judges could be constrained similarly.
District courts, however, could still fail to issue timely rul-
ings despite being bound to do so. Nor is it obvious that putting
time pressure on judges serves the interests of justice at either
the trial or appellate court levels. In addition to potentially
forcing last-minute decisions, this approach also requires a pro-
cedure for appellate court approval of district court delays in is-
suing rulings. Thus, this approach may lead to unfairness and
consume scarce judicial resources.
not implicate the power of the court to decide a case, and, therefore, there is
no reason to assume functional appellate jurisdiction should bar extension.
90. While many appellate courts have held that post-appeal rulings by dis-
trict courts are null, none has criticized the lower courts for their lack of time-
liness, suggesting that trial court judges are not to blame for "late" or
"missing" rulings. See supra note 9 (citing appellate court decisions, none of
which criticizes the actions of the trial court).
91. MNN. STAT. § 480A.08(3) (1990).
92. I& The statute reads, in pertinent part:
A decision shall be rendered in every case within 90 days after oral
argument or after the final submission of briefs or memoranda by the
parties, whichever is later. The chief justice or the chief judge may
waive the 90-day limitation for any proceeding before the court of ap-
peals for good cause shown.
Id. The 90-day time limit begins when oral argument is heard or the filings of
briefs is final.
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D. JUDICIAL REINTERPRETATION OF RULE 104.01
A more effective solution would be for the Minnesota
Supreme Court to overrule the court of appeals' interpretation
of Rule 104.0193 as mandating the trial court's loss of jurisdic-
tion to decide pending post-trial motions on appeal. By inter-
preting the rule as implementing appellate jurisdiction rather
than subsuming it into subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court could permit trial courts to retain the power to decide
post-trial motions pending on appeal.
Procedurally, appellants still would file a notice of their in-
tent to appeal within ninety days of judgment. The notice
would state whether any post-trial motions still were pending.
The court of appeals would stay consideration of the appeal un-
til after the trial court issued rulings. Parties would not be re-
quired to file briefs until they received the trial court's
decision.94
This approach cures the unfairness and inefficiencies Rule
104.01 creates, but it adds an extra procedural step by requiring
appellants to file two notices of their appeal. Although the
rules could be restructured to cure the defects of the appeals
timing rule in order to avoid the possibility of double-filing, a
judicial decision to allow trial courts to retain jurisdiction to
enter rulings on post-trial motions would eliminate early ap-
peals and missing or late rulings without requiring large-scale
revisions of civil appellate procedures.
CONCLUSION
Rule 104.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Pro-
cedure, which governs the time period for appealing from judg-
ment, serves the court system and litigants poorly. Missing or
late rulings encourage the inefficient use of judicial and party
resources and can have an unfair impact on the parties. Appel-
93. See supra note 60 (citing cases).
94. To implement fully this new interpretation of Rule 104.01 in cases in
which the appellant files a supersedeas bond under Rule 108.01, the Legisla-
ture would have to amend Rule 108.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appel-
late Procedure. As it stands, Rule 108.03 states that a supersedeas bond "shall
stay all further proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order ap-
pealed from." To be consistent with the interpretation of Rule 104.01 proposed
here, Rule 108.03 would need to allow trial courts to continue proceedings on
post-trial motions made prior to appeal. See Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344
N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1984) (holding that trial courts must relinquish jurisdiction
upon perfection of appeal, per Rule 108.03, except with regard to collateral
matters).
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late jurisdiction based on the final judgment rule requires that
rulings on all post-trial motions affecting the judgment be made
before appeal. The current discretionary use of late rulings is
an awkward attempt at a solution that does little to cure the
problems Rule 104.01 causes. Allowing trial courts to retain ju-
risdiction to decide post-trial motions timely would eliminate
early appeals as well as missing and late rulings.
